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IN THE SUPRFMF COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
L E A H M. I >ALY, Executrix for 
the Estate of Eva Dean Daly, 
deceased,
 JW . ..,- 1 tt 
' PI<minit ana lit s>**> 
GEORGE : / ^ i , r , 
iicU'vdn? .fitil Appellant. 
BR]i!.l< ,, «i« i;i::\llC)iNilENT 
Case No. 
13517 
K M E N T S O F F A C T 
Tin- [mine in question is located ai 1500 iirxaii 
Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah. I t was purchased in 
1952, for the sum of $18,500, T5. Mrs. Daly worked 
for a period of 45 years throughout \wv marriage and 
retired after the divorce action i t! '^vw commenced, 
T6. The daughter, Leah Daly,. \n\\ all of the money 
she made as an employee of the Mountain States Tele-
phone Company into the marriage beginning in 1951, 
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and continuing through the year 1962, during which 
years she contributed to her mother $40,720, T37. 
Leah had a partnership during this period of 
time under the name of Alta Junior Ski School. Leah 
lived exclusively on the funds she received from this 
partnership. All of her wages from the telephone com-
pany were paid into the account maintained by her 
mother and father. Leah also has done all the lawn 
work and house painting and cleaning for a period of 
21 years, T39. 
Appellant was born April 19, 1897, and was 76 
years old, not 67 years old as alleged in appellant's 
brief, at the time of the trial, T54. Appellant has never 
done any of the lawn work, T39. Appellant never did 
pay any of the bills, T40. In addition to the contribu-
tions by Leah of her wages during the period mentioned, 
she bought with her own funds the wishwasher, a wash-
ing machine, dryer, garbage disposal, all the furniture 
in the living room, the pictures on the walls, carpet 
in living room, dining room and hall, the carpet in 
both bedrooms, a double bed and two single beds for 
the basement, a color television, all at a cost of $4,200, 
T40. She paid with her own money all of these 
amounts, T41. Leah also purchased about $40 worth 
of groceries each month which she was able to pur-
chase at a wholesale price including most of the meat 
consumed in the home which she paid for from her 
own funds, T41. In addition when they would go to 
the store for groceries, she would pay for the groceries 
from her own funds, T42. Leah and Respondent in 
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addition to im IU-III^ paid for exclusively by I ;eah pur-
chased *l.ooo worth of drapes which they paid for 
Appeii<m,., whose name was on the joint bank 
account with ids wife, wrote checks in an amount of 
between $100 and $150 per month for his own use from 
said joint account, T27. 
The decree of the Court awarded the Respondent 
the title to the real property, subject to an equitable 
lien in favor A the Appellant in the si nil of $8,000, 
which was payable $100 per month without interest 
commencing the first day of August, 1973. Appellant 
received $77 per month retirement from the State of 
Utah and at the time of the trial received $227 per 
month from Social Security, T54, and $5.00" per month 
cost of living increase, T82, plus the $100 per month 
which has been paid each month on the equitable lien 
on the property making a total of $409.00, per month. 
Appellant has medicare and medicard plus he has insur-
ance in the Horace Mann Insurance Company that 
pays all the costs of medicines after payment of the 
'* * $75.00 each year and the amount of hospital bills 
inire does not pay, T12, T70. 
Kcsp. . . >ipmi her retirement on Maivh :>], 
. :i, recei -inn of $212.90 per in<>nlh fix>m Social 
urity iu^. , .--MM) p* h-.,-h n-r ;n->nth ;Yont ^n\\ 
..»Ke City, total $332.90. Ti: j . from which she was 
ordered to pay $100 pr» month to (he Appellant to 
retire the equitable lien of $8,000 on Uu rr^prr»\ 
3 
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A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D I N F A I L I N G 
TO G R A N T D E F E N D A N T S MOTIONS TO 
DISMISS A N D / O R M O D I F Y T H E I N T E R -
L O C U T O R Y D E C R E E O F D I V O R C E I N 
L I G H T O F C H A N G E D CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The Defendant's motion to dismiss P38 is based 
entirely on the fact that the plaintiff died on Septem-
ber 23, 1973, before the interlocutory decree became 
final. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the early case of 
Parsons -vs- Parsons, 40 Utah 602, 122 P907, @909 
held "The cases are applicable upon the points that the 
so called interlocutory decree is an adjudication on 
merits of all controversies arising upon the issues and 
like any other judgment on merits is subject only to 
be vacated or modified on appeal . . . or on other pro-
ceedings known to the Code for reexamination on 
review of a cause on the merits". 
The Court in the case of Rasmussen -vs- Call, Dis-
trict Judge 55 Utah 597, 188 P 275 @276 after quot-
ing with approval from the case of Parsons -vs- Parsons 
supra held that the decree of August 29, 1919, dis-
solving the marriage, gave to the plaintiff a real, sub-
stantial right, cannot well be questioned. . . . The ef-
fect of the interlocutory decree being to vest in plaintiff 
certain personal and property rights, it necessarily fol-
4 
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lows that the existence of those rights denies to any 
court, the authority or right to take the same from her 
except upon legal proceedings in which plaintiff had 
an opportunity to be heard in disproof of any attack 
upon such r ights . . . . Sufficient cause means legal cause. 
In the case of in re Harpers Estate, Anderson 
-vs- Harper, 1 Utah 2nd 296, 265 P 2nd, 1005, @1006. 
The appeal was taken from a decree of the trial 
court determining title to certain real property to be 
vested in respondent as the survivor of a joint tenancy. 
The question presented was concerned with the effect 
of death of one of the parties* 
"When the death of one of the parties occurs 
after the entry of a divorce decree and before the decree 
is final, the decree becomes ineffective to dissolve the 
marriage, death having terminated that personal rela-
tionship. However, the occurrence of death does not 
abate the action itself and to the extent that property 
rights are terminated by the decree, it remains effective 
and becomes final in the same manner, and at the same 
time as one between living persons. (Emphasis added) 
The reasoning of the Rasmussen case (Rasmussen 
-vs- Call District Judge supra) is applicable to the 
instant case. All the property rights granted Fred W. 
Harper by the divorce decree vested upon his death, 
in his heirs and devisees subject to the statutory limi-
tations of the decree itself and applicable probate pro-
ceeding." 
5 
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I t is clear that the mere fact of death of the plain-
tiff, Eva Dean Daly, did not abate the action relating 
to the property rights that had been determined by 
the Court as part of the interlocutory decree. 
The defendant's motion to modify the interlocutory 
decree by awarding to the appellant the home of the 
parties located at 1806 Bryan Avenue, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and the life insurance described in the decree 
P 40. The ground for such modification is described 
as "the changed conditions of the parties, growing out 
of the plaintiff's death". 
The applicable facts are that both the plaintiff 
and defendant worked for approximately 45 years and 
were at the time of the trial both retired. Their joint 
earnings were kept in a joint bank account from which 
the appellant withdrew between $100 and $150 per 
month for his own use, T27. Leah Daly, the daughter 
of the parties, lived with her father and mother. Dur-
ing the eleven years from 1951 to 1962, T37, she was 
employed by Mountain Bell Telephone Company and 
in her spare time operated the Alta Junior Ski School 
as a partnership. During those years she lived on her 
earnings from the Alta Ski School and donated the 
salary she received from Mountain Bell Telephone 
Company amounting to the sum of $42,720, T37, to 
the joint account of her mother and father, T37. 
At the time of the trial appellant was receiving 
$227 per month from Social Security, $77 per month 
retirement from State of Utah, T54, and $5.00 per 
6 
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month cost of living increase, T82, making a total of 
$309.00 per month. Appellant also had medicare and 
medicade and a policy with Horace Mann Insurance 
Company that pays for all medicine after the first 
$75 worth in each year and pay the hospital bills medi-
care does not pay, T12, T70. 
The Respondent after her retirement on March 
31, 1973, received $212.90 from Social Security, $120 
per month pension from Salt Lake City. She had medi-
care and medicade and a policy with Horace Mann 
Insurance Co. for payment of medicines and hospi-
tal fees like her husband's policy. After paying $100 
per month to appellant on the equitable lien of $8,000, 
she had a net monthly income of $232.90. 
The Court gave the savings account in First 
Security Bank to the appellant amounting to approxi-
mately $300 and the family automobile. Mrs. Daly 
received the home, subject to an $8,000 equitable lien 
in favor of the appellant and the household furniture, 
furnishings and appliances. 
After the death of the Respondent, Leah Daly 
executrix of the Estate of Eva Dean Daly was substi-
tuted as party plaintiff and respondent in said action. 
The Respondent submits that there has been no 
change of circumstances upon which the court should 
make any revisions of the interlocutory decree. The 
appellant still receives his Social Security in the sum 
of $227.00 per month plus an increase of 11% during 
7 
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the year of 1974. He still receives the pension in the 
sum of $77 per month from the State of Utah and 
$5.00 per month cost of living increase and $100 per 
month from the Respondent on the equitable lien on 
the home and will continue to receive the same until 
$8,000 has been paid which will be in approximately 
71/? years. 
The trial court considered the question as to which 
party should be awarded the real property and decided 
that the appellant, a man of 76 years of age, who had 
done no yard or lawn work for the past 25 years and 
who was in poor health would be better off with an 
equitable lien of $8,000 on the home, payable at the 
rate of $100 per month, than to give him an undivided 
interest in the real property with respondent. 
The Utah Supreme Court in many cases has enun-
ciated its opinion of the advanced position of the trial 
judge in being able to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. 
In Anderson vs. Anderson, 18 Utah 2nd 286, 422 
Pac 2nd 193, the Utah Court said: 
"Recent pronouncements of this court, and the 
policy to which we adhere are to the effect that the 
trial judge has considerable latitude of discretion in 
such matters and that his judgment should not be 
changed lightly and in fact not at all, unless it works 
such a manifest injustice or inequity as to indicate a 
clear abuse of discretion." 
8 
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In Stone vs. Stone, 19 Utah 2nd 378, 431 Pac 2nd 
802, the Court said: 
"The Findings and Order are endowed with a 
presumption of validity and the burden is upon the 
appellant to show they are in error . . . accordingly we 
recognize that it is the prerogative of the judge to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses, and in case of 
conflict we assume that the trial court believed the evi-
dence which support the finding. W e review the whole 
evidence in the light most favorable to them; and we 
will not disturb them merely because this court might 
have viewed the matter differently, but only if the evi-
dence clearly preponderates against the findings". 
(Emphasis added) 
In Jensen vs. Nielsen, 26 Utah 2nd 96 485 Pac. 
2nd 673 note one at page 675. 
"Even though as plaintiffs contend this Court may 
review the evidence in a case of equity, due to the 
prerogatives and advance position of the trial court we 
look with favor upon the findings and judgment and 
do not disturb unless the evidence clearly preponderates 
against them", citing 
Stone vs. Stone supra 
Wiese vs. Wiese, 24 Utah 2nd 236, 469 Pac. 
2nd 504. 
The interlocutory decree determined the property 
rights of the parties, even though the respondent died 
before the decree became final. Harper's Estate supra. 
9 
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"The decree remained effective and becomes final 
in the same manner and at the same time as one between 
living persons". 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that the law and the evidence abun-
dantly justifies the order of the trial court in denying 
the motion to dismiss the action. That the Utah law 
is clear that the death of the Respondent did not abate 
the action as far as the awarding of property rights to 
the Respondent is concerned. That the property rights 
vested in the heirs of the Respondent at her death. We 
further submit that there has been no change of cir-
cumstances sufficient to justify the amendment of said 
decree. The appellant will be adequately taken care 
of for the rest of his life under the terms of said decree. 
Respectfully submitted, 
G R A N T M A C F A R L A N E , SR. 
752 Union Pacific Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Counsel for Respondent 
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C E R T I F I C A T E OF M A I L I N G 
Two copies of the above and foregoing Brief of 
Respondent were posted in the U.S. mail postage paid 
and addressed to the Attorney for the Appellant, David 
J . Knowlton of Vlahos & Gale, at 312 Eccles Bldg., 
Ogden, Utah, and Horace J . Knowlton, at 214 Tenth 
Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, and copies thereof were 
delivered to the Clerk of the Supreme Court, State 
Capital Building, Salt Lake City, on this 4^~day of 
October, 1974. 
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